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PARADOXES IN EVALUATING MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAMMES
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IN recent years, attention to mental illness has extended beyond the problemI af custody, and a variety of services and programmes have developed external
to the mental hospital. Partly in response to the cost of custodial care, prevention
on the one hand and rehabilitation on the other have become important goals.
These new dimensions have now increased in commitment of effort and money
to the point where they constitute a major enterprise. They have also become
interwoven with existing social welfare programmes.
Thus, social agencies originally intending to serve families with domestic
problems, or children in need, or special disadvantaged groups, may now concern
themselves with the mental health of their clients from a prophylactic viewpoint,
or because mental illness has directly or indirectly affected those with whom they
deal. Likewise, educational and recreational programmes relate themselves to
mental health, sometimes through deliberate efforts, and more often indirectly,
in the belief that their existing activities are relevant. Indeed, the mental hygiene
movement that started as an attack on problems directly associated with mental
hospitals has become so diffuse and pervasive that it is impossible to draw its
boundaries and define its purposes, agencies and activities in any simple way.
In this context of interest, the importance of evaluation is broadly recog-
nized. The meaning given to evaluation, however, is varied; it is sometimes
confused, and frequently oversimplified. If persons are making a devoted effort,
it is hard for them and for those sympathetic to their objectives not to feel that
a contribution of some sort is being made. Therefore, industrious and sincere
application to the problem is often taken as the equivalent of achieving successful
results as a consequence of the effort expended. But the magnitude and impor-
tance of programmes in mental health as well as in other social services require
that evaluation go beyond appraisal of effort in this sense.
Although need for evaluation is recognized, it is rarely taken as an occasion
to examine the efficacy of programmes or techniques against objective tests of
successful results. Evaluation in the mental health field occurs at different levels,
implicating different sets of values. At one level, evaluation is equated with
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satisfaction of the recipients or the purveyors of the service. If they like it, it is
good; if they are dissatisfied with it, it is not. At a second level, evaluation may
mean a comparative but subjective appraisal of one service or activity among
several that are offered, often by &dquo;experts&dquo; whose criteria are presumed to have
wider relevance than those directly involved in the activity. It has been pointed
out in one comprehensive review of evaluation in mental health that, at this
level:
&dquo;... No precise yardstick is used to make the evaluation. Although
there is danger that hunches, hypotheses, personal bias, and faulty judg-
ment may enter into the evaluation process, this method is recognized and
supported by the community and government.&dquo; 
.
A third level of evaluation is that of scientific measurement involving
standardized and logical methods of assessment, widely recognized in other areas,
but seldom applied in mental health or social welfare. Evaluation in this sense
is often tedious, difficult and undramatic. Nevertheless, it is only through the
rigorous and painstaking effort required for scientific evaluation that information
necessary for sound appraisal of even the most conscientious effort can be made.
Evaluation at this third level requires more stability and security for the
agencies involved than evaluation at the other two levels. It is unlikely that
those offering services, or communities supporting them, will tolerate scientific
evaluation unless they feel fairly secure about their achievements. Otherwise,
rigorous and detailed evaluation of certain aspects of a total programme may
constitute an intolerable threat. It may, indeed, be harmful rather than construc-
tive if it fails to acknowledge the commitment of the agency to its objectives.
However, as pointed out in a U.S. Public Health Service publication, &dquo;If used
properly and interpreted correctly, this type of evaluation is of great help in
improving the overall programme, and it is also useful in gaining public support
for expansion or continuation of the programme.&dquo;
It may be assumed, in view of the magnitude of effort and investment made
in mental health programmes and activities, that scientific evaluation is now
overdue and can be used constructively. It is with this sort of evaluation that
the following discussion is concerned. -
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION IN MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE
There is nothing especially magical or esoteric about evaluative research.
It occurs in many different fields, and the principles that are involved are common
to all. In essence, evaluative research requires only the simple notion of a control
group design, where subjects who are exposed to treatment are compared to
subjects who receive no treatment (or a known, different treatment), and where
the subjects for both groups are selected on a random basis, and presumably
do not differ on any essential criteria prior to assignment as treatment or com-
parison cases. Evaluation is simply an attempt to give a logical answer to the
questio~n: Has a given effort, and that alone, resulted in an observable and
desirable outcome?
Sometimes the investment of effort is of such dramatic return that evalua-
tive research is superfluous. This is not the case in the field of mental illness,
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where there is almost the opposite situation. The necessity of giving attention
to the patient is itself often considered of prime significance, so that no concern
is given to finding out whether success did indeed result from the effort. Efficacy
of effort in social welfare programmes, however, is not demonstrable in any
clear-cut manner by obvious effects. Enthusiasm and satisfaction cannot be
substituted for evaluation.
A review of the literature of evaluation in the fields of mental health and
social welfare would prove disappointing. There are but few studies that have
given attention to rigorous research design, and to adequate samples. A com-
mittee of the National Advisory Mental Health Council made an extensive survey
of published and current research and reported its findings in a recent book
entitled Evaluation in Mental Health. Among almost 1,000 titles, very few
represent scientific evaluative studies. The committee makes the following
comment:
&dquo;In reviewing the literature the committee has been impressed with
the quantity of research studies.... However, the numbers of studies
embodying adequate methodology for scientific validation of the efficacy
of treatment procedures are few. Absence of control groups in studies on
the results of treatment seems to be the rule....&dquo;
The paucity of scientific evaluation in mental health is not a result of
ignorance or stupidity of researchers nor of stubborn refusal to accept the canons
of science. It probably results, first of all, from the enthusiasm of effort that
cannot wait for calm, dispassionate assessment. In the second place, it reflects
the fairly undeveloped state of knowledge about mental illness in general.
Conceptualization of mental health and illness, diagnosis, theories of xtiolagy,
methods of treatment and control, and, indeed, the very description of disease
processes, are far from systematic. Recently a number of efforts have been made
to place knowledge about mental health in the perspective required, if services
and programmes are to be based on more than limited and partial conceptions
of the problem. This is particularly the case with respect to social, as compared
to medical, attacks on mental illness.
There have been many publications representing polemic exhortations, case-
materials indicating the interplay of patient and therapist, descriptions of how a
given psychotherapeutic procedure is carried out, subjective appraisals of the
presumed consequences of therapeutic intervention, and general expositions of
theories about personality, social conditions, situational factors and mental
health. Study of concomitants of mental illness and recovery has taken place
in scattered and disjointed fashion rather than cumulatively. Few systematic
reviews of these scattered reports have appeared but many pieces of prognostic
information have been published. A comprehensive study of the literature has
recently been undertaken by Joseph Zubin and his associates at the New York
State Psychiatric Institute. Such reviews should provide a fund of knowledge
in organized form that may be suggestive of many hypotheses for understanding
factors associated with mental illness, and those associated with treatment.
A third reason why scientific evaluation both in mental health and in social
welfare has been rare arises from some difficulties inherent in the character of
programmes in these fields, and these are now discussed.
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BARRIERS TO EVALUATIVE RESEARCH IN SOCIAL WELFARE AND MENTAL HEALTH
If the principle of control group design which lies at the base of evaluative
research is easy to understand, its application in the practical situation is a much
more difficult matter. Many factors serve to hinder the implementation of such
research in practising social agencies. Among these are the following:
(1) In order to be effective, practitioners often feel that they must maintain
confidence in their own procedures. An attitude of confidence when dealing with
the patient or client is often viewed as a prerequisite to good practice, and this
attitude involves belief in the efficacy of treatment procedures used. In the light
of this attitude, professional defensiveness against having the efficacy of treatment
brought under question is understandable. When several professions are involved,
as is usually the case, the problem becomes even more delicate and complex.
(2) Agencies providing services must depend on public support and are
almost always on limited budgets. In part, the reputation of an agency may
depend on its appearance of smooth and efficient operation. Evaluation research
design may require an interruption in the flow of cases into the agency and hence
represent a visible threat to the agency’s operations. Thus, such research may
become not only a burden of unanticipated expenses, but it may also appear
as a diversion of resources within the agency. In addition, it may place a strain
on the ordinary administrative and operative procedures. Thus, it may appear
to undermine the basis upon which the agency seeks support from the public.
(3) Evaluative research may expose the realistic operations of the agency
in contrast to its public appearance. At the manifest level, the work of an agency
may appear focused on its public objectives. However, a considerable amount of
effort may go into incidental services for a wide variety of persons not conceived
to be the principal objects of interest. Because evaluative research forces attention
to what is actually done rather than what is intended, it may force the agency
to reveal and to recognize its multiple functions. Any organization that has
existed for some time will ordinarily acquire many secondary functions beyond
those for which it has been established. To make a public acknowledgment of
these activities may well be upsetting, and resistance to evaluative research may
arise from this basis.
(4) Other barriers to evaluative research in social welfare agencies arise
from some of the specific demands that the research design itself may create.
Difficulties from this source tend to centre on a number of focal issues.
Evaluative research requires that specific control or comparison groups be
designated and utilized as standards of success. This involves the entire question
of defining what is meant by subjects suitable for agency attention and then
designating a segment of them for service, and another segment for no service.
Thus, the practitioner and the agency who assert the efficacy of their efforts may
well decry the fact that useful services are being withheld from some.
The designation of a control or comparison group not only requires the
identification of the relevant subject population, but it requires that the control
group be selected by the same criteria used to select the treatment group. This,
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in effect, means that clients are arbitrarily assigned to these groups and the
privilege of choosing those whom the practitioner believes &dquo;would best respond
to treatment&dquo; is lost. Once more, this challenges the judgment of the practitioner
and places on him the burden of proof as to his success. Random assignment to
treatment and comparison groups is necessary because, without it, it is impossible
to attribute the differences that may occur between the groups to the treatment
procedures rather than to possible selective factors. The effects of selection cannot
be handled on a post hoc basis without the very knowledge that evaluation
research is intended to yield.
The control group design requires that patients assigned to the experimental
group actually receive treatment. If the entire group does not receive treatment,
the question arises as to whether those who do were selected on some unknown
but relevant basis and hence were more (or less) likely to respond to the treat-
ment. While it is not necessary that every patient receives the treatment, the
preponderant group must; otherwise the generalization possible is restricted.
Thus, an agency must often take an aggressive approach to its clients. This may
seem inconsistent with the viewpoint that clients must voluntarily want services
for the treatment to be effective. The only alternative to aggressive attraction of
experimental subjects would be denial of services to some of those voluntarily
seeking them. This would be even more at variance with other values of the
helping professions.
The design of evaluative research may embrace the totality of an agency’s
activities rather than the specific therapeutic procedures the agency sees itself
as practising. In general, practitioners tend to think they have specific skills, and
that these produce the results they believe they achieve. When one comes to
measure service or treatment in an agency setting, however, the procedures may
be so interwoven with administrative, custodial, and other operations that it is
impossible to determine whether results are attributable to the treatment pro-
cedures or to the complex within which they occur. Hence, agencies may feel
that evaluation misses its mark when, in fact, effects result from activities not
at all conceived to be a part of treatment efforts.
Finally, evaluative research requires that practitioners articulate what they
mean by successful results of treatment. The criteria by which success is to be
judged need not be of any specific type so far as evaluation is concerned, but
they must be identifiable, so that they can be applied in a standardized way to
the relevant cases in both the experimental and comparison groups. Because
success is always a quantitative assertion, evaluation of success requires that
research indicate how many, how much, or how much more, of some given
change has occurred in the experimental group when compared with the control
group. What are &dquo;good&dquo; or desired changes, on the other hand, depend on
value-judgments that designate a specified criterion or set of criteria of success.
If these are not supplied by the practitioner in his own terms, they must be
devised by the researcher. If this occurs, the practitioner may feel that the
meaning of success and failure is imposed on him.
This can become a serious difficulty when certain viewpoints towards thera-
peutic success are taken by practitioners. Sometimes, particularly in psycho-
therapy, the practitioner asserts that each case is unique, and hence no criteria
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of success can be generally applied. This position denies that general knowledge
is used in treatment. If this were the case, evaluation would indeed be impossible,
but, likewise, it would be impossible to develop any principles of practice or
treatment. On other occasions, the practitioner may assert that only he can
have the intimate knowledge of his patients or clients necessary to permit
meaningful evaluation. This is tantamount to claiming private, perhaps omni-
potent, judgment as a requisite for evaluation, and runs counter to the scientific
canon of communicable, public knowledge. Finally, practitioners sometimes feel
that success is the equivalent of what has happened to their clients; in other
words, they take a retrospective view and identify perceived change with desired
change. With such a viewpoint, scientific evaluation becomes impossible and
meaningless except in the unlikely event that no changes at all take place.
The barriers to evaluative research that have been mentioned are not offered
as criticisms of agencies carrying on programmes in mental health or social
welfare so much as descriptions of some of the problems that must be faced.
Basically, these problems reflect conflicting values of practitioners on the one
hand and scientists on the other. But improvement in practice-whether in
engineering or medicine-has been made when scientific methodology is employed
in pursuit of the goals of practitioners. The so-called helping professions-social
work, psychotherapy, rehabilitation, etc.-must ultimately follow the model of
the older professions, such as medicine, and encourage, rather than resist, objec-
tive assessments of their activities. Those who engage in scientific evaluation are,
in turn, obligated to accept the valued goals of the agencies and programmes
they evaluate, and to acknowledge the good faith and sincerity of practitioners.
One obvious cause of difficulty in carrying out scientific evaluation in the
social welfare and mental health fields is unfamiliarity of the agencies and
practising professions with research requirements. Therefore, early evaluation
studies must be interpreted cautiously for a number of reasons. In the first place,
agencies may make a special effort when evaluation is taking place, and there-
fore what is evaluated may be unusual rather than typical. Contrariwise, the
work of the agency may be somewhat disrupted by evaluative research, and
therefore the results may reflect less than usual achievement. Furthermore,
evaluation seldom encompasses the total activities of an agency, and extreme
care must be taken to specify exactly what it applies to. Negative findings about
a part of a programme or an aspect of an agency’s efforts should not be taken
as an indication that other aspects are not effective. Certainly, the whole
programme should not be brought into question when only one part of it is
under evaluation.
Despite the problems that beset scientific evaluation, there can be no
alternative to facing them, and attempting, in the best possible spirit of mutual
understanding, to conduct such research. The difficulties should be recognized
in order that they can be overcome.
